Introduction
One of the most critical decisions made at the seventh Consultative Meeting of Central Asian leaders in Tashkent was the expansion of the regional cooperation format.[1] With Azerbaijan's approval to transition to full membership—having participated as a guest in previous years—the leaders reached a historic agreement to transform the C5 platform into C6.
This research entails two distinct aims. Firstly, it posits that the integration of Azerbaijan into the C5+1 mechanism represents more than a symbolic diplomatic overture for the U.S.; rather, it is a strategic outcome driven by global Rare Earth Element (REE) rivalry and logistical exigencies. Secondly, it examines this development as a pragmatic manifestation of Azerbaijan’s multi-vector foreign policy, designed to uphold national interests, fortify regional clout, and foster global integration through enhanced trade ties with Washington.
C6+1 from the U.S. Perspective: Strategic Imperatives and Expectations
An analysis of U.S. policies toward the region reveals three key aspects. Foremost among these is the critical role Azerbaijan plays in the global supply and logistics architecture concerning U.S. strategies. Azerbaijan is an indispensable actor in the logistics system, situated at the crossroads of global trade. It assumes a central role within the Middle Corridor, facilitating a seamless and secure flow of commerce, specifically by bypassing Russia and Iran[2]. Bolstered by major investments such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway and the Baku International Sea Trade Port (Alat), this strategic positioning has propelled the country beyond a mere transit route, transforming it into a full-fledged logistics hub.[3]
The second key aspect of U.S. priorities in the region is the supply security of Rare Earth Elements (REEs). According to International Energy Agency (IEA) data, China controls 51% of global REE mining and 76% of refining capacity. Data from Statista corroborates U.S. vulnerability in this domain; indeed, between 2020 and 2023, the U.S. sourced 70% of its REE imports from China. Within the scope of its strategy to mitigate this high dependency, Washington attributes two critical roles to Azerbaijan: first, its function as a logistics hub for transporting Central Asian resources to the West; and second, the alternative supply potential offered by the mineral reserves in the liberated Karabakh region.
The third fundamental priority for the U.S. in the region is to counterbalance the entrenched influence of Russia and China. Although Russia codifies the region as its sphere of influence (or 'backyard') under the 'Near Abroad' doctrine, it remains insufficient in bolstering its political and military dominance with economic capacity.[4] China is effectively filling this economic void left by Russia, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[5] The U.S., which has hitherto limited its presence to a narrow security perspective defined by the Iranian nuclear threat, Afghanistan-based extremism, and counter-terrorism, now aims to reverse this approach. In this strategic transformation, the evolution of the regional cooperation format from C5 to C6 with the inclusion of Azerbaijan constitutes a vital instrument for the Washington administration.
C6+1 from the Azerbaijani Perspective: National Interests and Pragmatism
Shifting the perspective to Azerbaijan reveals three main factors shaping the strategic equation. Foremost among these is the Baku administration's multi-vector foreign policy strategy, which prioritizes maintaining a balance between global powers. Following its separation from the Soviet Union, the Republic of Azerbaijan implemented a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at cultivating balanced and diverse ties with various international powers. This diplomatic strategy proved essential for safeguarding the nation's sovereignty, securing economic investments, and maintaining national security, especially considering the significant challenge posed by Armenia's three-decade-long occupation of approximately 20% of Azerbaijani territory.[6] In this context, the C6+1 formation is an important factor for Azerbaijan to counterbalance the presence of Russia, China, and Iran in the region.
The second cornerstone of the analysis is constituted by Azerbaijan's strategy of proactive engagement in regional dynamics. Baku emphasizes that regional policymaking should not relegate it to the periphery (C5+1) but rather ensure its direct inclusion (C6+1). Crucial to this context is the fact that Azerbaijan operates with the diplomatic clout acquired during its chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the geopolitical confidence bolstered by the victory in the Second Karabakh War. With this enhanced stature, Baku seeks to position itself as a game-changer rather than a mere attendee. This posture also reflects a preference for prioritizing strategic autonomy and local agency over policies dictated from the outside in its relations with Washington.
The third pillar of the analysis constitutes Azerbaijan's strategy to bolster its economic capacity and diversify its trade volume. To this end, the Baku administration has adopted the attraction of U.S.-origin Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as a priority policy. The most strategic dimension of this economic engagement involves the subsurface resources in the liberated Karabakh region. The region’s rich reserves of critical minerals and metals position the U.S. as a potential buyer and strategic partner due to their significance in global supply chains. Consequently, Azerbaijan positions the U.S. market as a critical target destination for the export of these resources.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the evolution of the C5+1 platform into the C6+1 format with Azerbaijan's full membership represents a strategic transformation driven by global Rare Earth Elements (REE) rivalry and logistical imperatives, rather than a mere symbolic diplomatic gesture. From the U.S. perspective, this expansion serves as a vital instrument to mitigate China's dominance in the REE supply chain and to establish a secure logistics architecture via the Middle Corridor, effectively bypassing Russia and Iran.
For Azerbaijan, this integration is a pragmatic achievement that validates Baku's multi-vector foreign policy strategy and its elevated geopolitical confidence following the Second Karabakh War. This process elevates Azerbaijan beyond a mere transit route, positioning it as an indispensable "game-changer" in the global equation through its strategic location and the mineral resources of the Karabakh region. Ultimately, the C6+1 mechanism offers a shared strategic framework where the national interests of Washington and Baku converge, redefining the balance of power in the region.
Bibliography
Cutler, Robert M. "Azerbaijan Joins Central Asia to Build a C6 Corridor Core." The Times of Central Asia. 24 Kasım 2025. https://timesca.com/azerbaijan-joins-central-asia-to-build-a-c6-corridor-core/.
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International Energy Agency. "Rare Earth Elements." IEA. Son güncelleme 24 Temmuz 2024. https://www.iea.org/reports/rare-earth-elements-2.
Nuriyev, Elkhan. “The European Union, Russia and China: Competing Regionalisms in the Eastern Partnership Region.” Connections: A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists, 18 Eylül 2020. https://www.connections.clio-online.net/article/id/fda-133268.
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The Times of Central Asia. "Azerbaijan Joins Central Asia to Build a ‘C6’ Corridor Core." Son güncelleme 12 Ağustos 2024. https://timesca.com/azerbaijan-joins-central-asia-to-build-a-c6-corridor-core/.
[1] Robert M. Cutler, "Azerbaijan Joins Central Asia to Build a C6 Corridor Core," The Times of Central Asia, 24 Kasım 2025, https://timesca.com/azerbaijan-joins-central-asia-to-build-a-c6-corridor-core/.
[2] 1. T. Z. Dashdamirova, "The Development of Azerbaijan's Foreign Trade Through Transport-Logistics Systems: Prospects for International Cooperation and Peace in the Context of SDG 16 and SDG 17," TIM 3 (2025): 2, https://doi.org/10.58225/tim.2025-3-446-452.
[3] A.g.e, 2.
[4] Elkhan Nuriyev, “The European Union, Russia and China: Competing Regionalisms in the Eastern Partnership Region,” Connections: A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists, 18 Eylül 2020, 3-5, https://www.connections.clio-online.net/article/id/fda-133268
[5] Nuriyev, “Competing Regionalisms,” 4.
[6] "Azerbaijan's Multi-vector Foreign Policy as a Key Pillar of Sovereignty, Stability and Strategic Development," EU Reporter, May 12, 2025, https://www.eureporter.co/world/azerbaijan-world/2025/05/12/azerbaijans-multi-vector-foreign-policy-as-a-key-pillar-of-sovereignty-stability-and-strategic-development/.